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Saturday, June 18, 2011

Vanessa Kachadurian, Truth or defamation?





"The truth is incontrovertible, malice may attack it, ignorance may deride it, but in the end; there it is." -Winston Churchill


Truth is a complete defense to a claim of defamation.
It is the great equalizer in any libel or slander suit. It is what the plaintiff's defamation lawyer fears the most; that what his client's accuser says is true. It does not matter that the defendant made the statement out of malice or out of bad faith, so long as the statement is true. Washer v. Bank of America (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 501, 509; Campanelli v. Regents of Univ. of Calif. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 572, 581; Rest. 2d, Torts § 581A; Francis v. Dun & Bradstreet (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 535, 540 (credit report, even one causing harm, is not defamatory if true); Ellenberger v. Espinosa (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 943, 953 (statements as to dentist's misconduct were true given Board of Dental Examiner's determination that dentist had been grossly negligent and in violation of provisions of Business and Professions Code).
So what does it mean to establish truth? Does that mean the defendant must establish the truth of his statements in every particular? Surprisingly, the answer is no.
It is sufficient if the defendant proves that the substance or the "gist" of the statement is true. Heuer v. Kee (1936) 14 Cal.App.2d 710, 714; Gantry Const. Co. v. American Pipe & Const. Co. (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 186, 194 ("The concept that it is the gist or sting of the alleged defamatory statements that must be false rather than the specific details of the charge is deeply rooted in our common law."). Weller v. American Broadcasting Cos. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 991, 1009, footnote, 17; See Campanelli, supra (admission that plaintiff basketball coach engaged in tirades so bad that seven players were thinking of quitting established truth of defendant's assertion that players "were in trouble psychologically").
But who bears the burden of proof? The previous rule in California was that the plaintiff needed to plead that the statements were false. This is no longer required. The burden of pleading and proving that the statements are true rests squarely on the shoulders of the defendant. See Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary School Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 224, 233.


http://www.defamationlawblog.com/2009/08/articles/defamation-basics/truth-is-a-defense-to-a-claim-of-defamation/

Defamation - New York Court of Appeals Addresses Fact Versus Opinion in Summary Judgment Context
Halstead v. Brokaw (Motion for leave to appeal granted on Dec. 10, 2010) 74 A.D.3d 1283 (2010)
The appeal concerns one of three related actions to recover damages for defamation. The novel issue appears to concern a court’s determination of whether a statement is one of opinion or of fact. The Court of Appeals will likely re-examine its holding in Gross v. New York Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146 (1993), which set forth the following relevant factors for a court to determine whether a statement is an opinion or of fact: “(1) whether the specific language in issue has a precise meaning which is readily understood; (2) whether the statements are capable of being proven true or false; and (3) whether either the full context of the communication in which the statement appears or the broader social context and surrounding circumstances are such as to 'signal . . . readers or listeners that what is being read or heard is likely to be opinion, not fact.' " (Id. [quoting Steinhilber v. Alphonse, 68 N.Y.2d 283, 292 [1986]).
A unanimous panel at the Second Department granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the second action. The Court held that the plaintiff in action No. 2 failed to raise a triable issue of fact.